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SUMMARY 
WILLIAMS v. GARCETTI: THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HOLDING 
PARENTS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR THE 
ACTS OF THEIR CHILDREN 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Youth violence and crime are on the rise. l In an effort to 
curb this increase in juvenile crime many states are taking 
action,2 including television advertisements aimed at chil-
dren;3 school education programs;4 and new laws directed at 
parents.5 By enacting new laws directed at parents, state leg-
islatures are attempting to increase the responsibility of par-
ents for the acts of their children and thereby decrease juvenile 
crime.6 
Laws which hold parents liable for the acts of their chil-
1. Toni Weinstein, Note, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The 
Legality of Criminal Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 859 (1991). 
2. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169·B:41 (1994), MO. ANN. STAT. § 
568.050 (West Supp. 1994), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.41.1 (Anderson 1994), 
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1) (Baldwin 1984), N.Y. PENAL LAw § 260.10(2) 
(West 1989), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14·316.1 (1993), ALA. CODE § 12·15·13 (Michie 
Supp. 1994). 
3. For Kid's Sake (NBC television commercial). 
4. DARE, Drug Awareness Resistance Education. DARE is a school education 
program aimed at elementary, junior high, and high school students which teaches 
the students about the dangers and harmful effects of drugs. DARE. 
5. See supra note 2. 
6. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Davis, 368 N.E.2d 336, 337·38 (Ohio 1977). In 
Liberty Mutual, the court noted that one purpose of parental liability laws is to 
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dren are not a new development in California.7 California has 
already established the legal principle of parental tort liabili-
ty.s Parental tort liability has been extended to require par-
ents to reimburse schools for damage caused by their child's 
criminal conduct.9 
This summary will examine California's effort to curb 
youth violence through the amendment of Penal Code section 
272.10 California Penal Code section 272 prohibits adults from 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor.l1 The amended 
portion of Penal Code section 272 mandates parents be held 
7. CAL. CN. CODE § 1714.l(a) (West Supp. 1995). Section 1714.l(a) provides 
in pertinent part: "Any act of willful misconduct of a minor which results in injury 
or death to another person . . . shall be imputed to the parent or guardian having 
custody and control of the minor . . . ." 
8. [d. 
9. See Curry v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495 (Ct. App. 1993). In 
Curry, the court held that the parents of a minor, who allegedly molested another 
minor on school grounds, had to indemnify the school based on the parents negli-
gent supervision of their child. 
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995). The amended language of the 
statute adds the statement, "a parent or legal guardian to any person under the 
age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, pro-
tection, and control over their minor child." [d. 
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995) Entitled "Causing, encouraging 
or contributing to delinquency of person under 18 years," provides: 
[d. 
Every person who commits any act or omits the perfor-
mance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends 
to cause or encourage any person under the age of 18 
years to come within the provisions of Section 300, 601, 
or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or which act 
or omission contributes thereto, or any person who, by 
any act or omission, or by threats, commands, or persua-
sion, induces or endeavors to induce any person under the 
age of 18 years or any ward or dependent child of the 
juvenile court to fail or refuse to conform to a lawful 
order of the juvenile court, or to do or to perform any act 
or to follow any course of conduct or to so live as would 
cause or manifestly tend to cause any such person to 
become or to remain a person within the provisions of 
Section 300, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction 
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two 
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by imprison-
ment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment in a county jail, or may 
be released on probation for a period not exceeding five 
years. 
2
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criminally liable for failing to take reasonable care to protect 
and control their children.12 
The application and enforcement of this new law has cre-
ated an abundance of controversy.13 While many people feel 
that Penal Code section 272, as amended, improperly focuses 
on parents and thus is an inappropriate way to solve the prob-
lem of juvenile crime, others believe the converse is true, 
namely that it is necessary to place more of the burden of 
deterring juvenile crime on parents.14 
As a result of the controversy surrounding Penal Code 
section 272, the American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter 
"ACLU") brought suit on behalf of the taxpayers of Los Angeles 
County alleging that the amended statute was unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad, and violated a parent's right to 
privacy. 15 In Williams v. Garcetti, the California Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld the validity of Penal Code section 
272.16 
The first section of this summary will explain the factual 
background and procedural history of Williams v. Garcetti. 
The second section will examine the legislative history of the 
amended penal code. The final section will discuss the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's reasoning and holding. 
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995) (as amended). 
13. See Court Voids Crime Law That Aimed at Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 
1991, at A12; see also Claire Safran, Is it a crime to be a bad parent? Holding 
parents responsible for their children's delinquency & crimes, WOMEN'S DAY, May 
1, 1990, at 64.; Alma E. Hill, Crime Doesn't Wear a Watch, NEWSDAY, April 30, 
1992, at 118; Richard Whitmire, American Trends - Parents Held Accountable for 
Juvenile Crime, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 30, 1991; Nick Cohen, Climbdown 
Over Fines for Parents of Offenders, THE INDEPENDENT, May 11, 1991, at 3. 
14. Whitmire, supra note 13. The article lays out the various viewpoints sur-
rounding parental criminal liability laws. One commentator thought the new laws 
were emerging due to the belief that no one is taking responsibility to rear their 
children. 
15. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 508-9 (Cal. 1993) (per Mosk, J., the 
other panel members were Lucas, C.J., Panelli, J., Kennard. J., Arabian, J., 
Baxter, J., and George, J.). 
16. [d. at 517. 
3
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Ms. Gloria Williams was the first parent to be arrested 
and prosecuted under amended Penal Code section 272.17 Ms. 
Williams was the mother of a 17 year old boy suspected in a 
gang rape. 1S Ms. Williams was arrested when the police found 
a "gang museum" in her apartment which consisted of graffiti 
on the walls, a photo album of family members holding guns 
and making gang signals, and a picture of an eight year-old's 
birthday cake with the child's gang name written in blue 
icing. 19 
Ms. Williams was released from jail after she obtained a 
certificate showing she had graduated from a parenting 
class.20 The charges against Ms. Williams were subsequently 
dismissed. 21 Nevertheless, parents feared that enforcement of 
Penal Code section 272 placed them at similar risk of prosecu-
tion.22 Thus, the taxpayers of Los Angeles County, outraged 
over the arrest of Ms. Williams, challenged the constitutional-
ity of the amended section 272 alleging that the amended stat-
ute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and violated a 
parent's right to privacy.23 
The ACLU brought suit on behalf of the taxpayers of Los 
Angeles County alleging that the amended Penal Code consti-
17. Claire Safran, Is it a crime to be a bad parent? Holding parents responsi-
ble for their children's delinquency & crime. WOMEN'S DAY. May 1. 1990. at 65. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 64. Ms. Williams had also taken her son for some counseling which 
is provided for under the Parental Diversion Program. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
1001.70 (West Supp. 1995). The Parental Diversion Program was established in 
continuity with section 272. Under the Parental Diversion Program the local prose-
cutor has the authority to review any prosecutions under Penal Code section 272 
and establish a diversion program for the accused. Successful completion of the 
program will result in dismissal of the charges for violating Penal Code section 
272. 
21. Court Rejects 'Gang Mom' Law. THE COURIER JOURNAL. Dec. 22, 1991. at 
18A . 
. 22. See Toni Weinstein. Note. Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The 
Legality of Criminal Parental Liability Statutes. 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 859. 860 
(1991). 
23. Williams v. Reiner. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991). reu'd sub nom. 
Williams v. Garcetti. 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). 
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tuted public waste because it was unconstitutionally vague, 
overbroad, and violated the taxpayers' right to privacy under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.24 After both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment, the trial court entered summary judg-
ment for the defendant, the State of California, concluding that 
the statute was neither unconstitutionally vague nor 
overbroad.25 
The ACLU appealed the trial court's grant of defendant's 
motion for summary judgment.26 The court of appeal reversed 
on the grounds that the amendment was "impermissibly vague 
and incapable of being uniformly enforced or applied by law 
enforcement agencies and courtS.'127 The court of appeal found 
that the amendment criminalized parental conduct without 
establishing a standard by which cour.ts and law enforcement 
agencies could determine what constitutes reasonable care.28 
The court did not address the issue of overbreadth because it 
found the amendment unconstitutionally vague.29 
The court of appeal ordered the trial court to enter sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiffs.3o The defendants appealed 
the court of appeals judgment to the California Supreme Court 
contending that amended section 272 is neither unconstitution-
ally vague nor overbroad.31 
III. BACKGROUND 
In 1988, in an effort to control violent criminal street 
gangs, the California State Legislature passed Senate Bill 1555 
24. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 509 (Cal. 1993). 
25. Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 479 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd sub 
nom. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). The trial court held that the 
duties referred to in the amended penal section 272 are "articulated in language 
familiar and widely used in the law." Id. at 479. 
26. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479. 
27. Id. at 488. 
28. Id. at 483. The court reasoned that, "the amendment leaves too much 
room for abuse and mischief in its enforcement because any law enforcement agen-
cy is free to decide, based on purely subjective factors, whether the parents exer-
cised reasonable control and supervision over their child." Id. 
29. Id. at 488. 
30. Id. 
31. See Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). 
5
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(hereinafter "SB 1555").32 A major portion of SB 1555 consist-
ed of the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, 
which sought to reduce juvenile crime by increasing the penal-
ty for an adult who used violent coercion to enlist a minor into 
a street gang.33 SB 1555 also amended section 272 of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code, which prohibited the causing, encouraging, 
or contributing to the delinquency of a minor.34 
The amendment to Penal Code section 272 provided that 
parents may be found guilty of a misdemeanor for failing. to 
exercise reasonable care and control over their children.3s Un-
der amended Penal Code section 272, conviction is punishable 
by a fine not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars, or 
by imprisonment for not more than one year in the county jail, 
or both.36 The amended statute further provided that a parent 
may have the charges dismissed by seeking education, treat-
ment, or rehabilitation under the Parental Diversion Pro-
gram.37 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The California Supreme Court granted defendant's peti-
tion for review on April 3, 1992.38 The supreme court unani-
mously reversed the court of appeal and found the amendment 
to be constitutionally valid.39 The supreme court held that the 
amendment was not impermissibly vague because it incorpo-
rated definitions and limits of parental duties that had long 
been a part of California tort law.40 The California Supreme 
32. 11 S.B. 1555, 97th Cong., Reg. Sess. § 186.20 (1988). 
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.26 (West Supp. 1995). This statute is the Street 
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act which targets adults by holding them 
criminally liable for any action coercing a person under 18 years of age to actively 
participate in any criminal street gang. 
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995). 
35. Id. The amended language reads: "a parent or legal guardian to any per-
son under the age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care, 
supervision, protection, and control over their minor child." Id. 
36. Id. 
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.70 (West Supp. 1995). 
38. Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 479 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd Bub 
nom. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). 
39. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 517 (Cal. 1993). 
40. Id. at 514. 
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Court also held that the amendment was not overbroad.41 
A. VAGUENESS 
The United States Constitution and the California Consti-
tution mandate that laws may not be impermissibly vague.42 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part that no person be deprived of "life, 
liberty, or property without due process of the law."43 A law 
violates due process if it is so vague that it does not provide a 
standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed, 
and if it does not provide a standard for police enforcement 
and ascertainment of guilt. 44 In Kolender v. Lawson,45 the 
United States Supreme Court stated that the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine required that a penal statute must define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness so that ordinary 
people could understand what conduct was prohibited, and 
must not involve arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.46 
In Walker v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court 
adopted the United States Supreme Court's definition of 
vagueness.47 The court maintained that laws must provide 
people with fair notice of which acts are prohibited.48 The 
41. 1d. at 517. 
42. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XN; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 
852 (Cal. 1988); see generally, Amsterdam, The Void·for·Vagueness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
44. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; see also Walker, 763 P.2d 852. 
45. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). In Kolender, a California statute 
which required people who loitered or wandered on the streets to identify them-
selves and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer, was 
found unconstitutionally vague. 1d. at 361. The Court held that the statute pro-
moted arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because it vested virtually com-
plete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has 
satisfied the identification requirement and should be permitted to go on his way. 
1d. 
46. 1d. at 357. 
47. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988). In Walker, a 
mother was charged with involuntary manslaughter and felony child· endangerment 
of her four-year-old daughter from acute meningitis after the mother provided the 
child with spiritual treatment in lieu of medical care. 1d. at 871-73. The court 
found that relevant statute did not infringe upon due process by failing to provide 
notice of illegal conduct. 1d. 
48. See Walker, 763 P.2d at 872-73. The court held that the statute at issue 
7
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court further stated that in order to satisfy the requirement of 
fair notice courts must first look to the language of the statute, 
then to its legislative history, and finally to decisions constru-
ing the statutory language.49 
The Garcetti court noted that the starting point of a 
vagueness analysis is the "strong presumption that legislative 
enactments must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality 
clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears.,,50 A statute 
may not be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and 
practical construction can be given to its language. 51 
The court next examined whether the amendment altered 
or clarified Penal Code section 272.52 The court first looked to 
the legislative purpose behind the amendment. 53 Viewed in 
the context of the Street Terrorism and Enforcement Act, the 
court stated that it appeared the amendment intended to enlist 
parents as active participants in the effort to eradicate 
gangs. 54 The court found it unnecessary to decide if the 
amendment clarified or changed the existing Penal Code sec-
tion 272 because the only relevant question was whether the 
language of the amendment was sufficiently certain. 55 
provided "constitutionally sufficient notice to the mother that the prOViSion of 
prayer alone to her daughter would be accommodated only insofar as the child 
was not threatened with serious physical harm or illness." [d. at 873. 
49. Walker, 763 P.2d at 872 (providing that there is a strong presumption that 
legislative enactments must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, 
positively, and unmistakably appears). See also, Pryor v. Municipal Court, 599 
P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 171 P.2d 21 (Cal. 
1946). 
50. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 509 (Cal. 1993). 
51. [d. (citing Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 845 (Cal. 1988)). 
52. [d. at 510-11. The ACLU contended that the amendment changed the law 
by creating a new, impermissibly vague parental duty as a basis for criminal lia· 
bility. Defendants contended that the amendment merely clarified the statute's 
application to an existing parental duty. [d at 509-10. 
53. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 510. The Legislature enacted the amendment and the 
related Parental Diversion Program as part of the Street Terrorism Enforcement 
and Prevention Act. The court stated that the STEP act was premised on the fact 
that "California is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent street 
gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes 
against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods." [d. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
186.26 (West Supp. 1995). 
54. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 510. 
55. [d. at 510-11. The court did not state why it was unnecessary to decide if 
the amendment clarified or changed the existing § 272. The court held that the 
8
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1. Notice 
The court noted that the ACLU did not dispute the exis-
tence of a parental duty to exercise reasonable care and super-
vision of their children. 56 Thus, the court confined its analysis 
relevant inquiry was whether a parental duty of "reasonable care, SUpel'V1S10n, 
protection, and control" is sufficiently certain to withstand a vagueness challenge. 
Id. at 511. 
56. Id. at 511. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995). The pertinent 
part of the statute provides, "[e)very person who commits any act or omits the 
performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to cause or en-
courage any person under the age of 18 years to come within the provisions of 
Section 300, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code ... is guilty of a 
misdemeanor .... " See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1995). 
This code section contains a lengthy list of conditions under which a minor can be 
removed from the custody of a parent and declared a dependent child of the court. 
These conditions include: 
Id. 
(a) The minor has suffered . . . serious physical harm in-
flicted nonaccidentally upon the minor by the minor's 
parent or guardian . . . . (b) The minor has suffered . . . 
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure 
or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately 
supervise or protect the minor . . . (c) The minor is suf-
fering serious emotional damage . . . as a result of the 
conduct of the parent or guardian . . . (d) The minor has 
been sexually abused . . . by his or her parent or guard-
ian or a member of his or her household . . . (e) The 
minor is under the age of five and has suffered severe 
physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by 
the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have 
known that the person was physically abusing the mi-
nor . . . . (g) The minor has been left without any provi-
sion for support . . . (i) The minor has been subjected to 
an act or acts of cruelty by the parent or guardian or a 
member of his or her household . . . . 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1995) states: 
(a) Any person under the age of 18 years who persistently 
or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper 
orders or directions of his or her parents, guardian, or 
custodian, or who is beyond the control of that person, or 
who is under the age of 18 years when he violated any 
ordinance of any city or county of this state establishing 
a curfew based solely on age is within the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court which may adjudge the minor to be a 
ward of the court. (b) If a minor has four or more truan-
cies within one school year as defined by Section 48260 of 
the Education Code or a school attendance review board 
or probation officer determines that the available public 
and private services are insufficient or inappropriate to 
9
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to the meaning of the terms "supervision and control."57 The 
court analyzed the terms "supervision and control" in the con-
text of the California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 
601 and 602.58 The court noted that sections 601 and 602 ap-
ply to delinquent behavior. 59 Thus, the court reasoned that 
under the amendment parents are liable only when they fail to 
perform a duty of supervision and control, and omission of that 
duty results in their child's delinquency.60 
The court next analyzed the terms "supervision and con-
trol" in the context of California tort law.61 The court stated 
Id. 
correct the habitual truancy of the minor, or to correct 
the minor's persistent or habitual refusal to obey the 
reasonable and proper orders or directions of school au-
thorities, or if the minor fails to respond to directives of a 
school attendance review board or probation officer or to 
services provided, the minor is then within the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court which may adjudge the minor to 
be a ward of the court. However, it is the intent of the 
Legislature that no minor who is adjudged a ward of the 
court pursuant solely to this subdivision shall by removed 
from the custody of the parent or guardian except during 
school hours, 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1988) states: 
Id. 
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he 
violates any law of this state or of the United States or 
any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining 
crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based 
solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of 
the court. 
57. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 511. The court's analysis regarding the terms "su-
pervision and control" is in the context of the Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tions 601 and 602 and as defined by traditional notions of tort law. See supra 
note 56 (for relevant text of the statutes). 
58. See supra note 56 for the text of CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 601, 602. 
59. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 511. 
60. Id. 
61. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 511-12. Parents have long had a duty to supervise 
and control their children under California tort law. See, e.g., Singer v. Marx, 301 
P.2d 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956). Singer involved an action against a 9-year-old boy 
and his parents for damages for personal injury resulting from a rock thrown by 
the boy. The court held that the parent "has a special power of control over the 
conduct of the child, which he is under a duty to exercise reasonably for the pro-
tection of others." Id. Thus, a parent may become liable for an injury caused by 
the child where the parent's negligence made it possible for the child to cause 
the injury complained of, and probable that it would do so. [d. at 448. 
10
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that parents have long had a duty to supervise and control 
their children under California tort law. Thus, in amending 
Penal Code section 272, the legislature was not imposing a 
new duty on parents, rather it was incorporating the definition 
and limits of a traditional tort duty.62 
The court indicated that the scope of this tort duty was 
defined by the Restatement of Torts section 316.63 According 
to the Restatement, there exists a special relationship between 
parent and child which creates a duty in the parent to exercise 
reasonable care to control the minor.54 Accordingly, the court 
found that the terms "supervision and control" were consistent 
with the definitions and limits of the parental duty established 
in California tort law.65 
The court, combining its analysis of the Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code sections 601 and 602 with its analysis of the tort 
duty, concluded that the terms "supervision and control" "de-
scribe the duty of reasonable restraint of, and discipline for, a 
child's delinquent acts by parents who know or should know 
that their child is at risk of delinquency and that they are able 
to control the child.,,66 
62. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 512. California is not the first state to adopt notions 
of tort law and hold parents criminally liable for the acts of their children. See, 
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-701 (1988 & Supp. 1990). Colorado enacted the first 
version of its present law holding parents criminally liable for juvenile delinquency 
in 1903. For a further discussion of other state statutes which prohibit parents 
from contributing to the delinquency of a minor see Kathryn J. Parsley, Note, 
Constitutional Limitations on State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for 
the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, Note, 44 VAND. L. REV. 441, 446 (1991). 
63. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 512. There exists a: 
special relationship between parent and child and accord-
ingly places upon the parent a duty to exercise reasonable 
care so to control his minor child as to prevent it from 
intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself 
as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, 
if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he 
has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows' or 
should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercis-
ing such control. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1993). 
64. See RES'rATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1993). 
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While the court noted that neither the amendment nor 
prior case law set forth specific acts that a parent must per-
form, it concluded that this did not affect the clarity of the 
duty of supervision and control.67 Rather, the court asserted 
that the lack of specificity was inevitable and desirable be-
cause it would be impossible to provide a statutory definition 
of reasonable supervision and control. 68 By defining what a 
parent may not do, the amendment permits flexibility, and 
provides "reasonableness" as a guide for parents.69 
The court next analyzed the criminal negligence require-
ment of the statute.70 Because section 272 is a penal statute, 
parents must be criminally negligent in order to be liable un-
der the statute.71 The court thus held that the amendment 
imposed criminal liability only when parents were criminally 
negligent in breaching their duty of supervision and control.72 
The established rule regarding criminal negligence is that 
67. ld at 512-13. The court noted that in dependency cases terms similar to 
"supervision and control" have withstood challenge of vagueness grounds even 
though few cases have attempted to define proper parental care or control. ld. See 
In re J.T., 115 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding that a statute authorizing 
any person under the age of 18 years to be adjudged a dependent child of the 
court "who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and has no 
parent or guardian" was not unconstitutionally vague). 
68. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (stating that the concept of reasonableness serves 
as a guide for law-abiding parents who wish to comply with the statute). 
69. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513. The court stated that unlike the statute involved 
in Kolender, the amendment was not susceptible to interpretation in an "apt sen-
tence or two." ld. The court also stated that statutes are not automatically invali-
dated as vague simply because it is difficult to determine if marginal offenses fall 
within the statute's language. ld. 
70. ld. at 513. 
n. See Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd sub 
nom. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). See also, CAL. PENAL CODE § 
20 (West 1988) providing: "[i)n every crime or public offense there must exist a 
union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence;" CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 26 (West 1988) which provides in pertinent part that one is not capable of 
committing a crime "who committed the act or made the omission charged under 
an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent." Taken to-
gether, the court of appeals concluded that section 272 required an "intentional or 
grossly negligent failure to exercise due diligence in the performance of a known 
official duty." ld. 
72. See Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513. The court stated that the requirement of 
criminal negligence arises from Penal Code § 20 and the Legislature's use of the 
term "reasonable" in the amendment which denotes criminal negligence. See CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988). 
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"ordinary negligence sufficient for recovery in a civil action will 
not suffice; to constitute a criminal act the defendant's conduct 
must go beyond that required for civil liability and must 
amount to a gross or culpable departure from the required 
standard of care.,,73 The court reasoned that amended Penal 
Code section 272 thus punishes only negligence that exceeds 
ordinary civil negligence.74 A parent would therefore have to 
make a gross and culpable departure from the duty set forth in 
the amendment, to be held criminally liable.75 The court rea-
soned that the heightened requirements of criminal negligence 
alleviate any uncertainty as to what constitutes reasonable 
supervision or control. 76 
In addition, the court stated that there can be no criminal 
negligence without actual or constructive knowledge of the 
risk. 77 The court compared the knowledge requirement of 
amended Penal Code section 272 with that for involuntary 
manslaughter, which mandates that the act must be one which 
has "knowable and apparent potentialities for resulting death 
or great bodily injury."78 The court concluded that Penal Code 
section 272 as amended punishes only parents who knew or 
reasonably should have known that their child was at risk of 
delinquency, and thus provides a clear standard for determin-
73. People v. Peabody, 119 Cal. Rptr. 780, 786 (Ct. App. 1975). In Peabody, 
the court overturned a mother·s conviction for being criminally negligent for leav-
ing her child with her husband whom she knew beat the child. The court held 
that in order to constitute criminal negligence there must be a showing of gross 
conduct. [d. 
74. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513. 
75. [d. See also People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926 (Cal. 1955) where the court 
defined criminal negligence as "aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that is . . . 
such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or 
careful person under the same circumstances as to demonstrate . . . an indiffer-
ence to the consequences." [d. 
76. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513-14. The court found that the criminal negligence 
standard in regard to the breach of duty provided notice to law-abiding parents 
that was consistent with and reinforced the notice provided by the amendment's 
incorporation of the definition and limits of the tort duty of parental supervision 
and control. [d. 
77. [d. at 514 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Ct. App. 1960» 
(mother's conviction for leaving her child in a house that burned down while she 
was at a bar drinking was reversed for lack of proof of criminal negligence). 
78. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 514 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 863) 
(emphasis added). Under the criminal negligence test, knowledge of the risk is 
determined by an objective standard. [d. 
13
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ing what conduct is prohibited.79 
2. Enforcement 
Under the "void-for-vagueness doctrine," the amendment 
must also provide standards for application and adjudication to 
avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. so The Garc-
etti court stated that the enforcement requirement was the 
more important aspect of the doctrine of vagueness.S1 The rea-
son for its importance was that "where the legislature fails to 
provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may per-
mit a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, 
and juries to pursue their personal predilections."s2 The po-
tential for such arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement is the 
basis for the courts emphasis on the enforcement prong of the 
vagueness doctrine.s3 
The court stated that the amendment did not vest com-
plete discretion in law enforcement officials because the 
amendment incorporated the preexisting tort law definition of 
parental duty.84 In addition, the court found that application 
of the criminal negligence standard facilitated enforcement and 
adjudication by providing a measure which assessed a par-
ent's knowledge of, or authority over, a child's delinquent 
activities.s5 A parent who does not know or have reason to 
know of their child's delinquency cannot be prosecuted.s6 
79. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 514. 
80. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 108-09 (1972) (holding that an anti· 
noise ordinance prohibiting a person while on grounds adjacent to a building in 
which a school is in session from wilfully making a noise or diversion that dis· 
turbs the peace of the school session is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad). 
Id. 
81. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 358 (1983». 
82. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. The court found that the tort duty would supply police, prosecutors, 
and juries with sufficient guidance and minimize the danger of arbitrary or dis-
criminatory enforcement. Id. 
85. Id. The court stated that although the criminal negligence standard does 
not proscribe parental conduct with specificity it still provides a measure for en· 
forcement. Id. 
86. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515. 
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The court found that the causation element of section 272 
also reduced the likelihood of arbitrary or discriminatory en-
forcement.87 Under section 272 "a parent will be criminally 
liable only when his or her criminal negligence with regard to 
the duty of reasonable supervision and control causes or tends 
to cause or encourage the child to come within the provisions 
of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 601 or 602."88 The 
court stated that there may be some instances in which rea-
sonable minds could differ as to whether the parent's inade-
quate supervision caused the child's delinquency, but rea-
soned that the same causation question has always been an 
element of parental tort liability.89 Additionally, the court 
found that the opportunity for parental diversion from criminal 
prosecution under section 272 suggested that, as a practical 
matter, parents will only face criminal prosecution in extreme 
cases.90 The court concluded that the amendment, as con-
strued, did not impermissibly delegate arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement power to law enforcement agencies.91 
Thus, the amendment survived the vagueness challenge. 
B. OVERBREADTH 
An overbreadth challenge implicates the constitutional 
interest in "due process.,,92 The overbreadth doctrine provides 
that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities 
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved 
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby 
invade the area of protected freedoms.,,93 Thus, a clear and 
87. [d. Under Penal Code § 272 a parent will be criminally liable only when 
their conduct "causes or tends to cause or encourage" the child to come within the 
provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code § 601 or § 602. CAL. PENAL CODE § 
272 (West Supp. 1995). 
88. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 
1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 601, 602 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995). 
89. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515. The court noted that the causation element may 
be harder to apply when a parent·s action does not directly cause delinquency, 
such as when a parent is an accomplice, but the court found that causation has 
always been an element of parental tort liability. [d. 
90. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515. 
91. [d. 
92. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a), 24. 
93. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (holding that a statute 
which requires a foreign corporation to provide member lists substantially re-
15
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specific law may still be unconstitutionally overbroad if it 
infringes upon constitutionally protected conduct.94 
An overbreadth challenge, however, is difficult to sustain 
because courts require a showing of substantial overbreadth.95 
Consequently, to justify a conclusion of facial overbreadth, the 
plaintiff must be able to demonstrate from the text of the stat-
ute, and from its actual application, that there exists a sub-
stantial number of instances in which the statute cannot be 
applied constitutionally.96 The United States Supreme Court 
has held that application of the overbreadth doctrine is "mani-
festly strong medicine."97 Overbreadth is applied by the court 
only as a last resort.98 
Analyzing the ACLU's overbreadth challenge,99 the court 
first recognized the existence of a fundamental right to raise 
one's children. 100 The court determined, however, that the 
ACLU's overbreadth argument lacked the particularity neces-
sary to meet the requirements of substantial overbreadth. 101 
The overbreadth challenge as presented by the ACLU consisted 
only of "brief and general assertions of the amendment's limit-
less reach. ,,102 The court concluded that if in fact any over-
strained the NAACP's right to freedom of association). 
94. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (holding that an 
anti-noise ordinance was not unconstitutionally overbroad because expressive activi-
ty was only prohibited if it materially disrupted class work). 
95. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973) (holding that a 
statute prohibiting employee8 from actively engaging in partisan political activities 
among their coworkers for the benefit of their superior was not substantially 
overbroad because the worker's conduct fell squarely within activities which the 
state has power to regulate). 
96. See New York State Club Ass'n v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) 
(where the United States Supreme Court declined to strike down a statute which 
altered the definition of private clubs for anti-discrimination purposes because the 
plaintiff did not show that a substantial number of instances existed in which the 
statute could not be applied constitutionally). 
97. Broadrick, 601 U.S. at 613. Overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have 
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be 
applied to protected conduct. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940). 
98. Broadrick, 601 U.S. at 613. 
99. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 516 (Cal. 1993). 
100. [d. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925». 
101. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 516. 
102. [d. at 516-17. 
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breadth did exist, it could be cured through case-by-case analy-
sis. l03 Thus, the California Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment of the court of appeal, affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court, upheld the validity of Penal Code section 272.104 
V. CONCLUSION 
In an attempt to curb youth violence and crime, the Cali-
fornia legislature amended Penal Code section 272 so that 
parents could be criminally liable for failing to exercise reason-
able supervision and control over their children. l05 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal held that the amended section 272 was 
unconstitutionally vague. 106 In Williams v. Garcetti, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court unanimously held that the amendment 
to Penal Code section 272 was not unconstitutionally vague be-
cause it incorporated the traditional definitions of tort law and 
criminal negligence. 107 The court further held that the 
ACLU's challenge lacked the particularity necessary to meet a 
claim of substantial overbreadth. lOS 
Catherine Clements' 
103. Id at 517. 
104. Id. 
105. S.B. 1555, 97th Cong., Reg. Sess. § 186.20 (1988). See also CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995) (as amended). 
106. Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd sub nom. 
Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). 
107. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 517 (Cal. 1993). See also CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995) (as amended). 
108. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 517. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 
1995) (as amended). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. The author would like to 
thank Professor Joan Howarth for her research suggestions and editorial assistance in 
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17
Clements: Juvenile Justice
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
